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Some friends of eliminativism about ordinary material objects such as 
tables or statues think that we need to make exceptions. In this article, I 
am interested in Trenton Merricks’ claim that we need to make an excep-
tion for us, conscious beings, and that we are something over and above 
simples arranged in suitable ways, unlike tables or statues. I resist this 
need for making an exception, using the resources of four-dimensional-
ism.
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The eliminativist view about ordinary macroscopic objects like chairs or 
statues suits the taste of those who prefer desert landscapes to baroque 
complexity, and it nicely solves a number of problems (composition, vague-
ness, material constitution, coincidence, causal overdetermination,…).1 
It elegantly avoids these problems with ordinary objects since if there 
are no such objects, there are no worries concerning them. The issue I 
will be interested in this article is to see whether eliminativists need to 
make an exception—for us. Indeed, eliminativists such as Peter Van In-
wagen or Trenton Merricks famously argued (for different reasons and 
in different ways) that while eliminativism is the best theory around 
when it comes to tables, planets, or statues, it is not to be endorsed in 
the case of humans—an exception is to be made. Van Inwagen focuses 
on living entities, and Merricks focuses on conscious organisms. In this 
article, I will examine Merricks’ reason to make such an exception, and 
I will argue that it can be resisted.
The question is: can we eliminate the Self in the same—or simi-
lar—way we can eliminate tables and statues, without losing some-
1 See Unger (1979), Van Inwagen (1990), Merricks (2001), and Heller (1990, 
2008).
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thing important? Under ordinary-objects eliminativism, we can with-
out any loss eliminate tables and statues because there are simples 
arranged tablewise or statuewise and those can play the same practical 
and theoretical roles that tables or statues could play if they existed. 
(Eliminativism is also compatible with ontologies that do not postu-
late the existence of simples, but I will leave this issue aside here; see 
Benovsky (2016) for a detailed discussion.) In this view, chairs under-
stood as single objects, can be eliminated because there is a plurality 
of objects that takes their place, namely, simples arranged chairwise. 
I believe that the same strategy can be applied to the case of the Self, 
although it needs to be articulated in a way that suits such a special 
case. The basic idea is the same: a single entity such as the Self can be 
eliminated because there exists a plurality of other entities, namely, 
successive impermanent psychological states/experiences arranged 
‘Selfwise’. I have articulated in detail and defended this view in Ben-
ovsky (manuscript); here, my aim is to defend it against an objection 
raised by Merricks (2001).
The idea of such an eliminativism about the Self is that we can be 
eliminativists about us, understood in a reifi ed and ontologically com-
mitting sense of Selves, but that we don’t lose anything—I can still 
say “I am drinking a beer “ in a sense understood in terms of simples 
arranged my-body-wise and beerwise, and in terms of the existence of 
a succession of impermanent psychological states. This is how we can 
hold a unifi ed and complete eliminativist view, with no exceptions. In 
Merricks’ (2001) view, however, there is a disanalogy since entities like 
tables or statues are causally irrelevant—whatever they can cause, can 
be caused entirely by the simples that compose them. So, in his line of 
thought, this is one of the good reasons to say that tables do not exist. 
But, he adds that “we humans—in virtue of causing things by having 
conscious mental properties—are causally non-redundant” (Merricks 
2001: 114). When I decide to run, there is a cause to be understood in 
terms of microphysics or microbiology, but there also is a cause to be 
understood in terms of my decision. It is my decision, Merricks says, 
that causes the simples to move as they do. This is why we cannot 
be eliminated in the same way tables can be, since we are causally 
relevant—we have causal powers over and above the causal powers 
of simples that compose us. Merricks’ argument to the effect that we, 
human organisms, are causally non-redundant in virtue of having con-
scious mental properties is a complex and a very long one—indeed, it 
stretches on almost thirty pages (see Merricks 2001: Chap. 4). In what 
follows, let me focus on a (rather self-standing) part of his argument in 
detail and see how this step can be resisted—if it can, the overall argu-
ment will then not go through.
The main point of the argument is to show that we humans are not 
causally redundant, and that we have conscious mental properties that 
do “not supervene on what our parts are like” (Merricks 2001: 88). We 
 J. Benovsky: Are we causally redundant? 3
cause things in virtue of having these properties and we are therefore 
not causally redundant. (Thus, an argument based on the idea that we 
should eliminate anything that is causally redundant cannot be used 
to eliminate us—this is Merrick’s overall main point.) On the way of 
defending this claim, Merricks argues for the rejection of:
Consciousness (C). Necessarily, if some atoms A1…An compose a conscious 
object, then any atoms intrinsically like A1…An, interrelated by all the same 
spatiotemporal and causal interrelations as A1…An compose a conscious ob-
ject. (Merricks 2001: 94)
Here is, in short, Merricks’s argument against (C)—it is a variant of 
the ‘undetached parts argument’.2 Suppose a small part of you is an-
nihilated (say that your fi nger, or perhaps just an atom composing your 
fi nger, is cut away). Right after the amputation there is a conscious 
object—you—composed of some atoms. But these atoms existed in ex-
actly the same way just before the amputation—indeed, they composed 
a (big majority) part of you. But, if (C) is true, this means that even be-
fore the amputation there was an object that was part of you—let’s call 
it “you-minus”—that was a conscious object. So, it seems that before 
the amputation there were two non-identical conscious objects, namely 
you and you-minus. (By the same reasoning, there actually were many 
you-minus-like objects before the time of the amputation.) But this is 
false, since there was only one conscious object before the amputation. 
Thus, Merricks concludes, by reductio (C) is false.
In case one would be tempted to answer the objection by appeal-
ing to four-dimensionalism and using talk about temporal parts to 
escape the unwelcome consequence that there were two conscious ob-
jects before the amputation, Merricks provides a temporal version of 
the objection as well, which can be formulated as follows. Take a four-
dimensional person named “Trenton” who lives for 100 years. Take also 
another four-dimensional person, inhabiting the same possible world, 
who lives for only 80 years and is named “Trent”. Suppose that Trent is 
microphysically intrinsically exactly like the temporal part of Trenton 
who lives for the fi rst 80 years of Trenton’s existence, and let us call 
this temporal part of Trenton “Trenton-minus”, where Trenton-minus 
and Trent thus have atomic temporal parts exactly similar in intrinsic 
features and causal and spatiotemporal interrelations.
2 See Van Inwagen (1981); for a discussion see inter alia Heller (1990) and 
Benovsky (2006).
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According to Merricks, according to the four-dimensionalist, assuming 
(C) for reductio, when it comes to Trenton between the age of 0 and 80, 
we then have a case where there are two coincident persons: Trenton 
and Trenton-minus. Trenton-minus is a conscious person in virtue of 
the existence of Trent and in virtue of the truth of (C). But such coin-
cidence is unacceptable, and as a consequence, by reductio, (C) is false.
But the way Merricks presents the case here can be resisted. In-
deed, this is not how four-dimensionalists typically describe the situa-
tion. Here is Sider (2001: 6), about the Statue and Lump famous case of 
coincidence: “At any given time it is only a temporal part of a spacetime 
worm that is wholly present. Thus it is only temporal parts of Statue 
and Lump that are wholly present at the time of coincidence. How can 
these temporal parts both fi t into a single region of space? Because 
‘they’ are identical.” Sider then compares this to a case of a road:
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There is a road that has a subsegment. In the very middle of the road, 
should we say that there are two entities, namely, the road and the 
road subsegment? Of course not. There is only one entity—the middle 
section—common to both the road and the road segment.
Similarly for Trenton and Trenton-minus. At a time where ‘both’ 
Trenton and Trenton-minus exist, should we say that they are two per-
sons? Of course not. Before Trenton’s 80th birthday, there always was 
only one person, exactly as in the middle section of the road there is 
only one road. It’s just that this middle section is part of a road and 
of a road subsegment, and in the same way Trenton-minus is part of 
Trenton. This does not prevent Trenton-minus to be a person, as for 
instance David Lewis insists upon: “A person-stage is a physical object, 
just as a person is. (If persons had a ghostly part as well, so would 
person-stages.)” Lewis (1983: Postscript B). Typical examples of the 
way four-dimensionalism deals with such situations also involve cases 
of fi ssion.3 Let us say, for the sake of brevity, that for some reason a 
person undergoes fi ssion, perhaps using a transporting device such as 
the one commonly used on the USS Enterprise, where due to a mal-
function of the device, instead of simply transporting one person from 
one place to another, the device also leaves the original person behind. 
(You can replace this example with any other case of fi ssion, if you don’t 
like Star Trek stories.) Thus, after the fi ssion, there are two persons, 
exactly alike. According to four-dimensionalism, we then have a situa-
tion where there are two four-dimensional persons, sharing an initial 
segment:
3 I discuss one such case in detail in Benovsky (2013: 162–164).
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Under a typical endurantist reading, this situation is one where the 
threat of coincidence is real: Person1-after-fi ssion is not identical to 
Person2-after-fi ssion, but Person1-after-fi ssion is identical to Person1-
before-fi ssion, and Person2-after-fi ssion is identical to Person2-before-
fi ssion—we then seem to have a situation where Person1-before-fi ssion 
is identical to Person2-before-fi ssion, that is, where these two persons 
seem to coincide in an unpalatable sense. But not so under the four-
dimensionalist view where Person1-after-fi ssion is not identical to 
Person1-before-fi ssion, since these are two different temporal parts, 
numerically distinct, and similarly for Person2. In this way, (i) four-
dimensionalists do not have to face the threat of coincident entities,4 
and (ii) they can say, relevantly to our present discussion, that there is 
only one person before the fi ssion, in the same sense that there is only 
one person in the case of Trenton and Trenton-minus, and similarly in 
the spatial case of you and you-minus (in the fi nger amputation case). 
Metaphysically speaking, in all such cases where there seem to be two 
objects competing for the same space (and time), there really is only 
one, it’s just that it’s also part of other, spatially and/or temporally big-
ger, objects. It’s like a wall that’s common to two houses: if you need to 
repair it, you’ll only need bricks to repair one wall, not two. In the way 
Merricks describes the situations he uses in his argument, there seems 
to be something like the principle that only ‘the biggest’ object is the 
one that counts. Thus, only Trenton, but not Trenton-minus is a con-
scious object. In his argument, appealing to the existence of Trent and 
to the truth of (C), Merricks then wants to force his opponent to recog-
nize, for reductio, that Trenton-minus is a conscious object as well, thus 
creating a situation where there apparently are two distinct coincident 
objects that crowd each other out. But, as we have seen, four-dimen-
sionalists do not, and do not have to, understand this situation (as well 
as the other similar situations) in this way.
One issue still remains. Who is doing the thinking, in the four-di-
mensionalist view? Is it the whole worm, or is it only a (rather short-
lived) temporal part of the worm? If it were the whole worm, then—and 
only then—Merrick’s objection above would go through. So, in order for 
the reply to work, we have to say that it is not the whole worm that has 
thoughts but that it has them only in virtue of having temporal parts 
that have them. A possible objection arises here:5 say that a temporal 
part that lasts for only one minute thinks the thought “I have lived for 
50 years”. This is true, in a sense, because the whole worm did live for 
50 years. But it is false, when thought by the temporal part, since the 
temporal part only lived for one minute. So, the same thought seems to 
be both true and false—how messy!
4 I simply assume here, in agreement with Merricks, that such coincident entities 
are not acceptable.
5 I would like to thank Trenton Merricks for raising this point in a discussion.
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But this only points to a specifi c feature of four-dimensionalism (i.e. 
the worm view6). In this view, worms have most of their properties in 
virtue of the having of those properties by their temporal parts. The 
temporal parts can overlap, in the sense we have just seen, or in a 
fi ssion scenario. Thus, what is being thought or said at some point by 
some temporal part is ambiguous. Take the case of fi ssion we have seen 
above. Let us say that, before the fi ssion, the person that is there is 
called “Jean-Luc Picard”. From an atemporal standpoint such a name 
is then ambiguous, since it refers both to Person1 and Person2, and 
since these two overlap at the time before fi ssion, but not at the time 
after the fi ssion. But as David Lewis points out, such an ambiguity 
is perfectly harmless as long as the two bearers of the name “Jean-
Luc Picard” are indiscernible—that is, precisely, before the fi ssion (see 
Lewis 1983: 64–65). The need to distinguish the two persons arises 
only after the fi ssion, and there is no ambiguity there, since there clear-
ly are two persons, and we will use two different names to refer to them 
(even perhaps in a homonymic way). Similarly, what the one-minute-
long temporal part thinks or says is ambiguous, and it is true under 
one disambiguation and false under another. The problem then easily 
dissolves as a mere case of ambiguity.
As a consequence, using four-dimensionalism to answer Merricks’s 
objection, we can say that (C) is true, and thus one cannot use the al-
leged falsity of (C) to argue to the effect that we humans are not caus-
ally redundant because our conscious mental properties do not super-
vene on what our parts are like. And one cannot then use this as a 
reason to make an exception for us when it comes to eliminativism.7
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